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Dana Corp. - Growth Through Globalization 
Introduction 
Dana Corporation is a manufacturer of products and systems for the worldwide 
vehicular, industrial and off-highway original equipment markets and related 
aftermarkets. With sales of $8.3 billion in 1997, Dana continues to grow in several 
vehicle supply markets. The firm is most closely tied to auto manufacturers with 
Chrysler and Ford making up 30% of sales. Highway related vehicle sales (OEM and 
aftermarket) accounted for 80% of 1996 revenues. The greatest selling product line is 
axles, accounting for 30% of revenues to all markets, followed by engine parts (14%), 
driveshafts (11%) and frames (8%). 
Over the past several years, Dana has grown substantially around the globe. Sales 
more than doubled during the eleven-year period from 1986 to 1996, from $3.7 billion to 
$7.8 billion. In this same time period, net income grew at an even faster rate, nearly 
tripling from $84 million to $306 million. The stock market has approved of this growth 
and profit generation as the stock price doubled during the same eleven-year period (see 
Appendix 1 for financial data). 
Dana has two major goals. The first goal is to have 50% of sales come from 
outside the US by the year 2000. The second goal is to have sales divided evenly 
between the highway vehicles segment and the distribution, off-highway, service and 
industrial segments. Both goals will move Dana towards being a more diversified vehicle 
parts supplier. According to the 1996 Annual Report, two-thirds of this growth will come 
from expanding markets, increased market penetration and new product development. 
The remaining one-third will come from acquisitions. 
While Dana continues to utilize several modes for growth (acquisition, new 
products etc.) this paper will investigate and discuss Dana's approach to globalization. 
Currently, Dana's sales from outside the U.S. are 42% of all sales. The goal is to have 
50% by the year 2000. Dana has operations and joint ventures on 5 continents and 30 
countries including facilities in South America, Asia and Europe. In 1997, international 
sales topped $2.3 billion with another $700 million of exports from the U.S. Why has 
Dana been so successful at globalization? How does it approach new markets and new 
customers around the world? What are the challenges of and future strategies for 
globalization beyond the year 2000? 
History of Dana1 
In 1899, Clarence Spicer entered Cornell to study engineering. Fascinated by 
automobiles, he invented a "universal" joint for propeller shafts. Spicer patented the joint 
in 1903 and gained the attention of several automobile manufacturers in the US. Seeking 
to start his business in a region where people shared his religious beliefs (Spicer was a 
Seventh Day Baptist), Spicer moved to Plainfield, New Jersey where he rented some 
2 
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space at his relative's Potter's Printing Press Company. The firm was incorporated as 
Spicer Universal Joint Manufacturing Company. 
In 1904, the new automotive industry began to fall on hard times. By 1914, well 
over 1000 automotive related companies had failed, and Clarence Spicer's firm was 
moving in that direction as rapid expansion had increased costs. Looking for help, Spicer 
enlisted the help of an investment bank, which assigned Charles Dana to help the 
company. Seeing an opportunity, the young lawyer invested $25,000 for a controlling 
interest in the firm. With the boom of WWI, and some help from Charles Merrill of 
Merrill Lynch, Charles Dana and Clarence Spicer's firm was re-organized into the Spicer 
Manufacturing Company. 
The firm grew rapidly through sales and acquisitions. By the mid 1920's, the auto 
industry was shifting to Detroit. As annual revenue reached $10 million, land was 
purchased in Toledo in 1928 so Spicer Manufacturing could be closer to Detroit, but also 
a day's train ride from New Jersey so Charles Dana could frequently visit. During the 
1920's - 1940's, growth continued for Spicer Manufacturing, mostly through acquisition. 
The Salisbury Wheel Company was purchased in 1919 (it was renamed Spicer Axle in 
1970). In 1947, Auburn Clutch was purchased and renamed Spicer Clutch. There were 
many other acquisitions as well. During this timeframe, Charles Dana also led internal 
changes including employee education and benefits. Idea sharing and implementation 
was also paramount. By 1946, revenues hit $108 million, and the name of Spicer 
Manufacturing was changed to Dana Corporation, in honor of Charles Dana. 
Recession hit America again in 1957 and Dana's sales dropped by over 25%. 
This forced Dana to diversify from just automobiles and into the truck market. During 
the same year, Dana began its first overseas ventures by acquiring an interest in Albarus 
of Brazil. With the 1960's acquisitions of Perfect Circle and Victor Gaskets, Dana now 
had distributors of replacement parts with far-flung overseas operations. By 1972, Dana 
had a drive-shaft plant in Korea and later in the 1970's, Dana had an interest in two 
British firms. The process of globalization had begun. 
By 1967, Dana had annual revenues of $500 million. Ren McPherson became 
CEO in 1972 and continued to drive expansion. By 1979, Dana had grown to sales of 
$2.8 billion and employed 30,000 people worldwide. The next recession had a major 
impact on Dana as sales for its core products dropped by 50%. However, Dana was able 
to retrench, re-invest and stay profitable. More diversification occurred and the 
organization structure was flattened substantially from 12 layers to 6. By 1989, sales 
reached $4.85 billion. In the early 1990's, sales of Sport Utility Vehicles skyrocketed, 
and Dana was able to take advantage of this trend by selling its core products of frames, 
driveshafts and axles. Including its acquisitions (and some divestitures), 1993 sales rose 
by $600 million and 1994 sales rose by $1.1 billion. By 1995, Dana had become the 
largest independent automotive supplier in the US, and fourth on a global scale. 
Organizational Structure 
In 1996, Dana was a matrix organization. There were eight "Product Parents" 
responsible for the main businesses including axles, driveshafts, structural components, 
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engine products and leasing services. These were organized with four regional areas: 
North America, South America, Asia and Europe. The regions had line responsibility. 
With the major shifts in the automobile market, this structure was no longer the best for 
Dana. 
South wood "Woody" Morcott unveiled Dana's new organization structure in 
1997. Strategic Business Units (SBUs) were implemented with six new groups replacing 
the Product Parent structure. For instance, light axles, driveshafts and structural 
components were all separate businesses. Following the reorganization, they are all a 
part of the Automotive Components Group (see Appendix 2 for a more detailed 
description of the new organization structure and Appendix 3 for brands). This new 
structure is what President Joe Magliochetti calls now "one-stop shopping" for the 
customer. The SBU's are still supported by Dana corporate as well as the regional 
structure (North America, South America, Asia and Europe). This new organizational 
structure is intended to focus the company on its customers while still supporting 
different parts of the world. 
Strategy 
Dana's mission and strategy are encapsulated in the Beyond 2000 statement. Its 
motivation has come from past recessions. Woody Morcott explains: 
"When we came out of the 1991 recession we were determined to continue 
without subjecting ourselves to that trauma again. We responded by being 
more international, more diverse with markets and customers, and in 
general less dependent on OEM business - automotive in particular."2 
This is a five-pronged strategy statement (a more detailed description is in Appendix 4) 
including the following: 
1. Implementation of the Dana style throughout the organization. 
2. Dana will be the global systems and components supplier to its customers. 
3. Dana will receive 50% of sales from groups other than the highway vehicle 
segments. 
4. Total sales will be split evenly between the US and the rest of the world. 
5. Dana will provide superior returns to its shareholders. 
Points three and four represent two of Dana's key objectives. Both are intended 
to further diversify Dana and protect against future economic downturns. According to 
the 1997 Dana Annual Report, both goals are nearly achieved. International sales and 
exports reached 42% of all revenues and sales to the distribution, off-highway and 
industrial markets also reached 42% of revenues. 
2 Teresko, John, "A Supplier on a Roll," Industry Week. March 2, 1998. 
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Automotive Supply Market 
The automotive supply market has been undergoing massive changes in the past 
ten years and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. One of the key changes is, 
and will continue to be, the consolidation of the supplier base. From 1990 to 1996, the 
number of Tier One suppliers was reduced by 50% from 3000 to 1500.3 This trend is 
expected to continue for the next five to ten years with approximately 375 Tier One 
suppliers remaining by the end of the decade. As an example, B org-Warner has plans to 
double in size in five to seven years through internal growth and acquisitions. Such 
strategies are not uncommon in the auto supply base. In 1997, 109 mergers or 
acquisitions occurred valued at $11.1 billion, up from 93 transactions valued at $4.5 
billion in 1995.4 
Bigger is better if the supplier wants to survive. The survivors will fall into three 
categories: 1) large, diversified system integrator suppliers, 2) smaller, niche firms that 
will directly supply the OEM's, and 3) second-tier suppliers that will supply the first 
two.5 
A second trend is the continued evolution from parts suppliers to module or 
system integration suppliers. In the never-ending quest of the OEM's to cut cost, 
automakers like Chrysler look to their supply base to get involved sooner and share 
responsibility in the development process. The supply base has responded by increasing 
R&D capabilities and expanding their capabilities to provide system solutions. Lear has 
been cited as the first true system integrator with its seat and interior business. A system 
integrator may handle all the activities associated with one portion of the vehicle. This 
could include areas such as design, manufacturing and assembly. If the system integrator 
does not make the part, they will handle the procurement, unless otherwise specified. 
This greatly reduces the number suppliers the OEM must deal with. Taking systems 
integration to its fullest extent, Volkswagen has opened a plant in Brazil with a "modular 
consortium" concept that has suppliers in the final assembly plant responsible for every 
function except final testing.6 
A final important trend stems from the global expansion of the OEM's. Since the 
OEM's are offloading responsibility to the supply base, there is a need to have a supplier 
that can supply parts, modules and/or systems around the world. JIT needs are forcing 
suppliers to have operations near an OEM facility. This can put a great strain on the 
supply base as suppliers are not gaining any economies of scale through major domestic 
3 "Supplier Trends"; International Trade Services - AutoParts Report; December 3, 1997. 
4 Simison, Robert L., "New Dana Illustrates Reshaping of Auto Parts Business", The Wall Street Journal. 
September 2, 1997. 
5 "Supplier Trends"; International Trade Services - AutoParts Report, December 3, 1997. 
6 Lima, Edvaldo Pereira, "Detroit South?." Industry Week. November, 3, 1997. 
5 
Dana Corp. - Growth Through Globalization 
| plants. Furthermore, the capital investment to set-up foreign operations, even joint 
ventures, is quite high. 
Growth Model 
If cost cutting, downsizing and re-engineering were the buzzwords of the 1980's, 
then growth is the buzzword for the 1990's. According to University of Michigan 
Professor Aneel Karnani, "the primary objective of a company should be to maximize 
shareholder value. The only way to create value is to achieve a higher return than the 
cost of capital." Apparently, the auto industry is starting to agree. Many automakers and 
suppliers are starting to use EVA, or economic value-added, and its counterpart, RONA -
return on net assets, to measure success.8 Instead of looking at net sales or profits, EVA 
measures the amount of value creation, separating good growth from bad growth, 
otherwise know as value destruction. 
There are several ways to grow successfully. According to Professor Karnani, the 
expansion can come from industry consolidation, innovation, globalization, vertical 
integration, related diversification and unrelated diversification. Consolidation is one 
trend that has been very effective in recent years across many industries. Examples of 
industry consolidators include Columbia/HCA in healthcare and Blockbuster in video 
rentals. Consolidation is one of the key trends affecting the auto supply industry as well. 
In fact, Dana Corp is a key industry consolidator as it has made several major 
acquisitions over the past five years. 
Globalization 
Globalization is another key growth driver for many industries. This trend 
towards global growth has stemmed from several changes in the competitive landscape. 
The end of communism has opened up many lucrative markets in Europe and Asia. The 
emergence of trading blocks as increased access to markets. Modern telecommunications 
has provided faster knowledge transfer and exportation of western culture to new 
markets. New, emerging markets have presented organizations with endless possibilities. 
Finally, excess capacity and slow growth in mature markets has pushed companies to 
look outside their home markets. 
Globalization does not mean, however, that western firms can grow at will around 
the world. It does mean adapting to local needs and dealing with new competitors. 
These competitors may be a small, nimble local competitor or a growing multinational 
with the financial strength to compete for these new markets. Either way, the 
competition will only grow more intense. 
7 The 21st Century Supply Chain: The Changing Roles, Responsibilities and Relationships in the 
Automotive Industry, Office for the Study of Automotive Transportation - The University of Michigan 
Research Institute and AT Kearney. 
8 McElroy, John, "EVA changes how Detroit measures its executives", Automotive Industries, February 
1998. 
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There is also a host of new issues that the globally-growing firm must deal with. 
The list includes political instability, government intervention, unequal income 
distribution, poor infrastructure, inflation, shortages of skilled labor, intellectual property 
rights violations, overcapacity and inefficient financial systems. The recent demise of the 
Indonesian economy is an example of what can go wrong in a market. Rapid currency 
devaluation and political instability have dramatically damaged the Indonesian economy 
and any operating there. 
Dana Global Outlook9 
Global growth is a key part of Dana's overall strategy. The goal is to be the #1 or 
#2 automotive supplier. This goal is also translated to every division - #1 or #2 in market 
share for every division in their respective regions. Growing globally with their customer 
base is the preferred method. The customer is also the impetus for growth. Dana 
management believes that if you do not grow or plan to grow aggressively, then OEM's 
will perceive Dana as small and could potentially lose business. Management needs to 
continually remind its divisions that Dana is not the biggest supplier in the world. Vice 
President Gus Franklin explains: 
"Currently North America is second in vehicle production with 30% share 
behind Europe's 36%. In 2002, Europe will still have 36%, Asia will have 
32% and North America will fall to 27%. It's not good enough to be the 
number one supplier in the third largest market." 
An example Franklin likes to cite internally is Dana's structural business. Dana is the 
largest structural supplier in the U.S., but globally, Bentler is the largest supplier with 
Dana second. When Thyssen and Krupp-Hoesch merge they will jump to number one 
leaving Dana the third largest supplier, a position Dana does not like to be in. 
Dana also has an interesting visual way to measure global growth and remind 
customers what Dana is capable of globally. For each customer, it has a slide with Dana 
core products on the vertical axis, customer locations on the horizontal axis and each 
square either red, yellow or green (if a customer does not have a need for axles in 
Malaysia, for instance, this square would be left blank). If Dana currently has the 
business in that region for a specific product, the box is green. If there are discussions for 
Dana to gain this business, the box is yellow. If Dana does not supply the product, but 
could, the box is red. This is used for customer presentations, but is also a novel way to 
measure globalization growth internally. Obviously, Dana would like all the boxes to be 
green. 
9 Most information in this section comes from interviews with Dana executives. 
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multiple product lines across multiple customers. From 1993 - 1997, Dana acquired 30 
companies, twenty-four of which were based outside the U.S.13 Dana utilizes several 
methods of integration to introduce all levels of employees to Dana and its style of doing 
business. Once a business has been acquired, the product manager and SBU leader 
immediately welcome the employees to Dana through a personal visit. To reinforce this, 
the Chairman visits each new facility within the first year (he visits every Dana facility 
every year). The focus is put on education and employee involvement - part of the Dana 
Style. Involvement can be difficult for employees who have worked under a typical 
command and control structure, but Dana's experience has been that once employees are 
exposed to teams and employee involvement, they take to it quickly. In 1996, Dana's 
45,500 employees generated 666,120 suggestions. The suggestion system is an idea the 
Morcott "stole" from the Japanese in the 1980's14. The real challenge is middle 
management, and that's where Dana spends the bulk of the time and effort. 
One of Dana's principles is to promote from within. Sixty-six percent of Dana 
managers are promoted off the shop floor.15 Because this is a strong belief, Dana rarely 
replaces the top management of an acquisition. Franklin explains: 
"We promote from witfun so we have to give them a chance. If we 
immediately replace a plant manager with one of our own, then we are 
saying that we don't think they can handle it. Furthermore, we are telling 
the plant manager's direct reports that we think they can't handle the job 
either." 
This policy is also embraced out of necessity. Dana is growing so fast that they don't 
have all the personnel available to replace a recently acquire target. 
The top managers of an acquisition may retain their position, but they are 
immediately exposed to the Dana Style. These managers must immediately conform to 
the management process. This includes regional meetings, management meetings, Dana 
University, thirteen-month rolling forecasts and the annual review and planning session 
known as "Hell Week." Technology also plays a key role in acquisition integration. The 
month-end close takes place globally in three and a half days, and it has taken every 
acquisition no longer than three months to meet this tight schedule. Recently, it was 
decided that every business must use SAP, Baan or Oracle. While this is not complete 
integration, these systems are capable of communicating. Dana also has an internal email 
system as well as an Intranet for company communications. 
Once the newly acquired management has been exposed to the technology, 
financial controls, strategic planning process and the Dana Style, a determination can be 
made if the individual managers are qualified to remain with Dana. Franklin asserts this 
process takes anywhere from twelve to twenty-four months. Some are let go and others 
leave for other opportunities. The majority remain and seem to excel under the new 
management style. 
13 Smith, David C, "Global Punch," Ward's Auto World. May 1997. 
14 Teitelbaum, Richard, "How to Harness Grey Matter," Fortune. June 9, 1997. 
15 Gersten, Alan, "Bluegrass Meets Kabuki," Journal of Commerce. September 10, 1997. 
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To further integration, Dana is now utilizing cross-regional rotations for key 
positions. Traditionally, Dana stressed cross-functional skills for promotion. Now, the 
Global Resource Management Program, led by Dana's President Joe Magliochetti and 
four other top executives looks at all key openings on a global basis. The key positions 
include general management, plant management and controllers. For the next level of 
positions, mainly functional roles, a regional council reviews all open positions in a 
certain function for each of the four regions. Each management position, roughly 750 
positions globally, has a list of three people who are potentials to take over each specific 
job. This entire system is reviewed annually for improvement. This process enables 
managers to gain many functional skills as well as many cultural skills. It also brings 
stability to the management succession process at all levels. 
Joint Ventures16 
While joint ventures are a risky proposition to Dana, they are still heavily used. 
In fact, CFO Jack Simpson states that joint ventures are the best strategy to enter Asia. 
With most Asian customers, a local partner is needed to help navigate the local Asian 
business cultures. Dana is very selective when approaching potential JV partners. 
Partners must have compatible goals, sound financial base and strengths that can be 
leveraged, such as market access or low-cost manufacturing capabilities. Dana wants a 
majority ownership, but will accept a minority stake if they can gain a majority share in 
the future. It appears as though Dana would eventually like to take over all successful 
joint ventures. In March of this year, Dana announced the acquisition of full-ownership 
of a joint venture, SIMESC-Parish, its Brazilian joint venture in structural products. 
The structure of every joint venture is different according to Nitsch. It does not 
necessarily rest on who owns 51%. Case in point is one joint venture in Venezuela. Dana 
has a minority stake but the partner very much enjoys the benefits of being affiliated with 
the global powerhouse. Managers are sent on a regular basis to Dana University and all 
the employees wear Dana badges. Contrast this to a JV in Mexico in which Dana does 
have a majority stake. The relationship is described as arm's length and there is less 
integration. "Every venture has to be managed differently,"says Nitsch. 
Partners are also selected only if they have a long-term view of the market and 
emphasize value. Partners must also share Dana's core beliefs - empowerment, openness 
and ethical behavior. Dana management is not afraid to end a joint venture if these 
principles are violated. In November of 1997, Dana sold its 49% stake in the Korea 
Spice Corp. to its Korean partner. This joint venture was started over twenty years ago, 
but the Korean government in the early 1990's changed the partner - a "shotgun 
wedding," per Simpson. The new partner, Sung Shin Cement Industrial Co., Ltd., 
seemed to be operating in good faith and Dana was satisfied, but for reasons unknown to 
the public, Dana decided to abandon this JV in the lucrative Korean market. This does 
not mean that Dana has abandoned Korea. It still has its Dana Korea operation, but it 
16 Most information in this section came from CFO Jack Simpson's presentation at the University of 
Michigan Business School Asian Business Conference on January 23, 1998. 
17 "Dana Announces Acquisition of Brazilian Affiliate", press release, March 3, 1998. 
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will grow conservatively. As an aside, Simpson was not very upset at this divestiture. 
Dana recognized an $18 million after-tax profit from this divestiture, which occurred one 
week before the currency crisis hit Korea. 
Financial Goals and Performance 
Dana's overall financial performance has been impressive, and its goals are even 
more so. ROE is expected to be 20%. Sales revenue is expected to grow at a rate of 10% 
per annum (2/3 from acquisition and 1/3 from internal growth). Five percent is the return 
on sales target. The capital structure target is 40% debt and 60% equity. Working capital 
is targeted at 17.5% of sales and gross margins should grow at a rate of a half of a 
percentage point per year. In support of these goals, international operations are expected 
to reap 6% return on sales and a 17% RONA (return on net assets). 
Measurements are key to Dana's success, but those measurements do not include 
EVA. However, CFO Simpson does believe in MVA (Market Value Added) and DVA -
Dana Value Added. Over the past few years, Dana's stock price has steady increased, 
most notably in the past year, increasing MVA. DVA - an internal benchmark 
measurement consisting of adding debt and equity and multiplying the total by the cost of 
capital hurdle rate (12% for Dana) - has been consistently surpassed by Dana over the 
past few years (see Appendix 5). 
All the Financials indicators do not point in a positive direction, however. The 
consolidated financials are impressive, including over 4% ROS and substantial revenue 
and profit growth year over year. By breaking out the regional numbers, a different story 
unfolds. In 1997, operating income for North America was 9.2% of sales. European 
operations only managed 2.4% while the rest of international operations garnered 7%. 
Return on assets had similar numbers. Simpson does not like these numbers and wants 
them to improve. 
Dana has publicly stated that divisions that underperform, "boat anchors" as 
Simpson calls them, will be sold off. This divestiture strategy, over $900 million's worth 
in 1997, has helped fund the $1.3 billion in acquisitions in 1997 besides removing some 
under-performing divisions from the financial statements. Karl Nitsch, the new President 
of Dana Europe credits his European predecessor, Gus Franklin with improving the 
performance of European operations. 
"Return on sales almost doubled from last year due to Gus. Dana Europe 
also went from 65% sales of core products to 99% today." 
Dana was also able to close a money-losing plant in France, after a long battle 
with French labor unions and the government. Nitsch states that the consolidation in 
Europe will continue. 
Most information for this section came from interviews with Dana executives. 
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Emerging Markets 
Management knows that emerging markets, especially Asia and South America, 
present incredible opportunities for growth. For Asia, Dana believes that the time is now. 
Asia has a growing population base, vast geographic size, growing GDP and is still early 
in vehicle market development.20 Thailand is #3 in light truck production and #2 in 1-ton 
truck production - a great opportunity for Dana because of their experience with light 
trucks in the US. Despite these trends, the auto supplier will not rush in. In fact, it has 
not rushed in, and therefore, is not feeling any major effects from the currency crisis. 
Asia represents a long-term opportunity. l Case in point is China. One executive asserted 
that no one is making money in China. Dana has several facilities in China, but due to 
joint venture arrangements, there is only $20 million of Dana capital invested in China. 
This is changing, however, with the announcement that Dana will be building a new axle 
factory in the Fujian Province of China and the strategy that has seen revenues grow 
about 20% a year for the past few years.22 
A major reason for Dana's conservative attitude may stem from CFO Jack 
Simpson's experiences in Southeast Asia. Besides being a veteran with a substantial tour 
of duty in SE Asia, Simpson was also in charge of Asian operations in the 1980's. He 
recalled a story when he was having dinner in Indonesia in the 1980's. Dana had an axle 
plant there and was feeling the effects of competition. He overheard two men at the next 
table talking about Dana. The men stated that they would do anything to keep Dana out 
of Indonesia, even sell their own axles at below cost. "We got our butts kicked" Simpson 
states emphatically. Simpson believes one major reason for Dana's failure in Indonesia 
was sending American managers to operate a business in a country where the managers 
had no idea how to manage in such a different culture. "A good leader will work within 
the environment and understand the culture and language," sums up Simpson. 
South America is an area in which Dana is investing heavily and gaining profits. 
Morcott asserts that automobile manufacturers have announced $19 billion in investments 
in South America over the next five years and expects suppliers to have to invest a 
similar number.23 "Brazil is the most exciting auto market in the world," stated Chrysler's 
CEO Robert Eaton. Dana's revenues in Brazil, the largest South American market, 
totaled $550 million in 1996. Investments for 1997 were expected to be $150 million. 
According to Simpson, net margins are the best in South America compared to any other 
international regions, mainly due to tax issues. Mercosor - the trade group consisting of 
Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile and Bolivia - is comprised of 225 million 
12 
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26 Lima, 1998. 
27 Sedgwick, David, "Proving Ground: Brazil Offers Makers and Suppliers a Place for Beta Testing 
Manufacturing Ideas", Automotive News. August 4, 1997. 
28 Teresko, 1998. 
29 Phelan, Mark, "Sprechen sie megasupplier? Europe's Tier l's Struggle with Demands for Systems, 
Modules and Global Manufacturing," Automotive Industries. June 1997. 
30 Keenan, Tim, "Setting the Global Pace," Ward's Auto World. May 1997. 
I 
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A member of a European think tank believes that American suppliers are growing while 
catering to JIT and systems needs while the Europeans are more familiar with 
technologies and may prefer to grow "sticking to their technological roots."31 One auto 
executive points to Asia as the "next competitive battleground" 2 for the supply base. 
One thing is for sure, the competition will only get more fierce. 
Future Challenges 
Dana management recognizes many challenges as auto supplier grows. One issue 
that many in the auto industry are concerned about is over-capacity. Peter Hellman, 
President and COO of TRW, believes that globalization for growth is leading to a crisis 
of over-capacity.33 As OEM's grow around the world, some plants that will not operate at 
capacity, or fail. Therefore, there will be suppliers that have excess capacity. This 
happened to Chrysler and Dana in Austria. The Grand Cherokee plant's production is 
down 40%. Dana responded by sending parts from facilities in the UK and Brazil to be 
assembled in the Austrian Dana axle plant and then the parts are exported to other 
locations. This is a novel approach, but Dana management knows this solution can't be 
used everywhere. Dana contends it will continue to grow conservatively. It also means 
picking winners in each country. As an example, Dana managers are aware of the many 
OEMs entering China, but believe that all of them cannot be successful. 
A second challenge is growth in emerging economies. Franklin sees high risk and 
some high rewards. One OEM wants Dana to be its axle supplier in several locations, 
including Indonesia. The overall contract is very lucrative, but the prospect of Indonesia 
gives management pause. 
Continuing to develop people will be a challenge to Dana. With so much growth, 
it is difficult to fill all those positions with properly trained people. Changing mindsets is 
the other part of the equation. Top management does recognize that many managers have 
a "Midwestern mindset" in a global industry. Only 20% of the top twenty Dana 
managers were born outside of the U.S. 
Dana's Future Strategies 
Many in the auto industry, including Dana management, agree that the trends of 
consolidation, globalization and systems integration will continue. Therefore it is no 
surprise that Dana plans to continue with its "Beyond 2000" strategy. What may change 
beyond the year 2000 are the targets of diversification. Some executives see the 
percentage of sales outside the U.S. growing to as much as 70%. As Karl Nitsch 
explains: 
31 Phelan, 1998. 
32 Keenan, 1998. 
33 Gardner, Greg and Tom Murphy, "The Risk of Following Your Customers Around the Globe," Ward's 
Auto World. September 1997. 
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"Coca-Cola has more sales outside of the U.S. than inside, and it makes 
sense. There are many more people living outside the U.S. There is more 
vehicle production outside of the U.S." 
Gus Franklin sees bigger acquisitions on the horizon. It is only inevitable 
as most suppliers are growing. Eaton is Dana's largest acquisition to date, but 
Franklin sees the dollar values growing. 
The biggest change in Dana's strategy may come in the are of technology. 
Many customers are looking for more technology from their suppliers, especially 
Dana. This means many new investments. One is the new R&D center being 
built in Japan. This center will be dedicated to the Asian based OEMs. Another 
is the new Customer Support Center to be built in Germany. Both are responses 
to customer requests for local technical support. Management knows that if it 
wants to be a true systems supplier, then it must be able to develop new products. 
Moreover, at least in Europe, there is a recognized need to be more in passenger 
cars and not just trucks. This also requires technology. 
Besides customers demanding the increase investment in technology, 
Dana received a "kick in the gut" when it was rated last in technology in its 
industry by Fortune magazine last year. Dana management didn't fight this but 
responded to it. In addition to these two new technology centers, Dana has also 
acquired Thermoplast to get into plastics. Plastic materials are replacing many 
engine parts and are generally lighter than most metals. 
Conclusions 
Dana Corp. is clearly a respected and feared competitor in the auto supply market. 
Until this point, the conservative mode of expansion has served Dana well. Growth is a 
mainstay, not just a short-term strategy. Continued operational excellence and 
improvement allows Dana to fund future acquisitions and growth. The internal global 
support structures including Dana University and the Dana Style keep new ideas flowing 
and workforce energized. The SBU structure more closely aligns the far-flung operations 
with the proper market segments and customers. These are all reasons why the stock 
market and many acquisition targets like Dana. While the global market is changing, so 
is Dana, and for the better. 
While Dana continues to change and improve, some internal challenges remain that 
could preclude continued successful global growth in the years to come. One is the Dana 
brand name and all its product brand names. There are many brand names within Dana. 
Several customers know Spicer or Wix, but not necessarily Dana. Management realizes 
this, but will it change fast enough? Karl Nitsch commented that Dana has attended an 
industrial products exposition for many years, and for the first time had all its products 
shown under the Dana symbol this past year. This is a small step in a long journey to 
gain brand recognition in a rapidly globalizing industry. Moreover, Dana is just now 
looking at the area of globalizing their press releases. 
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Another area of concern is the make-up of the management team and its global focus. 
One magazine called Dana headquarters "as American as it gets"34 when commenting on 
the facilities. To date, only 20% of the top twenty executives were bora outside of the 
U.S. Dana does make great strides in getting its executives international experience - Gus 
Franklin spent several years in Europe and Jack Simpson has many years experience in 
Asia - to name a few, but is it enough? How much more success might Dana have in 
Asia if it did not need some of its joint venture partners to navigate the local Asian 
cultures? Certainly with the global rotations of mid-level managers, more leaders with 
more international roots and/or experience will rise into the ranks of top management, but 
will it be fast enough? 
A final area to be addressed is product technology. Dana recognizes that it is not 
widely respected for its technology and is making improvements. Management 
recognizes the need to have local engineering and R&D support for their customers and is 
acting on it. Dana is also acquiring firms with different technologies including plastics to 
be better prepared for new technology changes. This is only the first step, though. The 
key to this strategy is technology integration. Will the new R&D center in Japan 
interface and be able to share information with R&D in Toledo? Will Dana be able to 
develop and transfer knowledge for passenger cars? Will Dana be able to integrate new 
materials, such as plastics, into the core products that comprise so much of Dana's 
revenues? 
Dana's success comes from a number of attributes, including a conservative 
approach to expansion. The same approach that has gained Dana success to date may 
cause problems. Will the issues of technology, international managers and global brand 
image be improved fast enough for Dana to maintain its dominant position in the market? 
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Appendix 3 (adapted from www.dana.com) 
BRANDS 
Boston ® Industrial Hoses and Rubber Products 
Chelsea ® Power Take-Offs 
Gresen ® Pumps, Control Valves, and Filters 
Parish ® Frames, Side Rails, Cradles, Crossmembers, and Support Arms 
Perfect Circle ® Piston Rings, Piston Pins, Camshafts, Cylinder Sleeves, Valve Seals, 
and Steering and Suspension Components 
Spicer ® Axles, Transaxles, Driveshafts, Cardan and Constant Velocity Joints, Transfer 
Cases, and Transmissions 
Victor Reinz ® Gaskets, Sealing Products, Heat Shields, and Oil Seals 
Warner Electric ® Electric and Mechanical Clutches and Brakes, Industrial and 
Precision Ball Bearing Screws, Linear Bearings and Shafting, Linear Actuators and 
Sensors, Servos, Step Motors, and Voltage Controls 
Weatherhead ® Brass and Steel Fittings, Couplings, and Industrial Hose Products 
Wix ® Oil, Air, and Fuel Filters 
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Appendix 4 (adapted from www.dana.com) 
Beyond 2000 
Our Commitment to Growth 
1. The Dana Style Will Be Fully Implemented Throughout Dana's Globally Integrated 
Organization. 
• Dana people are our most important asset. 
. Dana's growth is dependent on People Finding a Better Way to improve continuously 
through concentration on-
-idea generation (minimum of two ideas per person per month, 80% implemented), 
-education (minimum of 40 hours per person per year), and 
-cooperation among Dana people globally. 
2. Dana Will Be The Global Systems and Component Supplier To The Customers We Serve. 
• Dana will become the global leader by-
-exceeding customers' expectations in everything we do, 
-focusing on being the best in quality, service and technology in each of our 
products, and 
-emphasizing cost effective core-products, systems and services. 
• Dana will continue to provide innovative leasing services. 
3. Dana Will Obtain 50% Of Sales From Highway Vehicle OEM Customers And 50% From 
Distribution, Off-Highway And Industrial Markets. 
. Two-thirds of the growth will come from our expanding markets, increased market 
penetration and new product development. 
• One-third of the growth will come through acquisitions. 
4. Dana Will Obtain 50% Of Our Total Sales Outside The United States. 
• Dana will continue to expand globally by-
-supporting our customers' global activities with regional facilities, 
-emphasizing export activities, and 
-focusing on growth sectors of international markets. 
5. Dana Will Be A Growth Company Providing Shareholders With Superior Investment 
• Through the accomplishment of the first four objectives, Dana will be positioned for 
continuous, profitable growth. 
• Dana's key financial goals are-
-Sales growth greater than 10% per year 
-Return on Sales greater than 5% after-tax 
-Return on Shareholders' Equity greater than 20% after-tax 
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